



The Crusader Raid in the Red Sea in 578/1182-83

Author(s): Gary La Viere Leiser

Source: *Journal of the American Research Center in Egypt*, Vol. 14 (1977), pp. 87-100

Published by: American Research Center in Egypt

Stable URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40000370>

Accessed: 13/05/2009 08:18

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at <http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp>. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.

Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at <http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=arce>.

Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission.

JSTOR is a not-for-profit organization founded in 1995 to build trusted digital archives for scholarship. We work with the scholarly community to preserve their work and the materials they rely upon, and to build a common research platform that promotes the discovery and use of these resources. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.



American Research Center in Egypt is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to *Journal of the American Research Center in Egypt*.

<http://www.jstor.org>

The Crusader Raid in the Red Sea in 578/1182—83*

GARY LA VIERE LEISER

Throughout the period of the Crusades, many events occurred which can only be described as unusual if not bizarre. The discovery of the Holy Lance and later the Children's Crusade are examples that come easily to mind. In the realm of military exploits, the Wars of the Cross witnessed the full range of human endeavor from the ignominious to the brilliant. One military adventure that must at least be considered fantastic and almost a stroke of genius was the Crusader raid in the Red Sea in 578/1182–83. It was conceived and executed by the notorious Reginald of Châtillon from his strongholds of Karak (*le Crac des Moabites*), just east of the southern end of the Dead Sea, and Shawbak (*le Crac de Montréal*), due south of the Dead Sea. This was the first European penetration of the Red Sea in force since 24 B.C. when Aelius Gallus led an expedition of Romans as far as southern Arabia.¹ After Reginald's raid, no European force would appear there again until 1513 when Portuguese warships rounded Africa and entered this insulated sea from the south.² Thus, except for this incident during the Crusades, the Red Sea remained beyond the touch of the European world for fifteen centuries.

The raid in 578/1182–83 has not been overlooked by modern historians of the Crusades. Indeed, when taking account of Reginald's career, it could hardly be ignored.³ But on the whole, their discussion of it has been very limited. In fact, unique as this event was, only one medieval European chronicler of the Crusades, Ernoul (fl. 1187),⁴ mentions it. Furthermore, his reference is so brief and misguided—he considered it to be a kind of journey of exploration—that it is almost useless. Medieval Muslim historians, on the other hand, have considerably more to say. Consequently, modern works on the Crusades have had to rely on the material that they have preserved. Nevertheless, these modern descriptions of our raid suffer from two drawbacks. First, no attempt has ever been made to assemble all the available material on this event and subject it to analysis. Second, most of the modern writers who have taken note of this raid did not know Arabic. Instead, they used, above all, the French translations of the various works collected in the well-known *Recueil des historiens des croisades: Historiens orientaux* (1872–1906). This allowed them to take advantage of the important information on this event found in Abū Shāma and Ibn al-Athīr, but meant that untranslated material, such as that in al-Dhahabī, remained unknown. Moreover, Ibn Jubayr, whose travelog has existed in several European languages for many years, has not been properly or fully utilized in this matter. He was an eyewitness to the dramatic act which brought this episode to a close. It will be the objective of this paper, then, to examine all of the data on this raid that has come to light and to reach some conclusions regarding its significance. As we shall see, it deserves more attention than it has heretofore received.

In 577/1182, the position of the Crusader states was precarious. The Second Crusade had run its course. The County of Edessa would remain lost forever. The Principality of Antioch had been reduced in size. The County of Tripoli and the Kingdom of Jerusalem were barely able to maintain themselves. To make matters worse, these three remaining states were far from united. Their

internal quarrels and rivalries had so intensified that they were on the verge of civil war. This domestic political strife was compounded by a serious decay in morals which was best personified by Sibylla, the wife of Bohemond III, the prince of Antioch. Not only did she have a reputation as a loose woman, but she was a spy in the pay of Saladin. Furthermore, the Franks could take little comfort in the hope of finding help abroad. Manuel I, the Byzantine emperor, had been their friend, but he was dead. Moreover, in 572/1176 he had suffered a defeat at Myriokephalon at the hands of the Saljūqs of Rūm from which his empire would never recover. The present emperor, Andronicus I, found it necessary, in fact, to ally himself with Saladin against the Saljūqs. In Europe, prospects for assistance were just as bleak. France and England were fully engaged in their own struggle over the Plantagenet territories in France and the Holy Roman Empire was distracted by events in northern Italy. The pope, meantime, devoted his energy to strengthening his influence in Europe and had no time for the problems of the Holy Land. For the Muslims, on the other hand, the situation was much different. In al-Muḥarram, 578/ May, 1182, Saladin returned to Syria from Egypt. He set about reasserting and extending his authority over all the territory facing the frontiers of the Crusaders. He would be only too successful in this and, as a result, create the most formidable opposition that the Franks had yet seen.⁵

It was while Saladin was in Syria that Reginald of Châtillon decided to put into effect an idea that he had surely had for some time. He would make an attack where it was least expected—at the very soul of the Islamic world—on Medina and Mecca. Such a daring strike might gravely wound Islam, capture the imagination of Europe, and attract reinforcements to the Latin states. It would especially raise the morale of the Crusaders themselves and lead, hopefully, to financial gain, the latter being no slight consideration for a bullheaded, vain man like Reginald. Thus, he prepared to assemble a fleet in the Gulf of ‘Aqaba and launch it upon the Red Sea to carry out this operation.

Karak and Shawbak were the most distant outposts of the Franks. From them Reginald could disrupt or harass Saladin’s communications with Egypt. In addition, he was able to impede the movement of any Muslim pilgrims who risked taking the overland route from Egypt to the Ḥijāz. Reginald knew of the wealth that often accompanied Muslim pilgrims. Already in 577/1181 he had captured a caravan near Taymā’, in the northern Ḥijāz, which was on its way from Damascus to Mecca.⁶ Ibn al-Athīr, in fact, says that his real intention was to march to Taymā’ and use it as a staging point for the capture of Medina.⁷ The intervention of Saladin’s nephew, ‘Izz al-Dīn Farukh-shāh, with troops from Damascus plus, no doubt, the difficulties of the terrain made Reginald settle for the caravan. It is likely that this experience led Reginald to resort to a combined sea and land assault on the Ḥijāz on an even larger scale. Moreover, a fleet would allow him to prey on the rich India trade of Egypt as well as on the pilgrim traffic between the ports of ‘Aydhāb, on the Egyptian coast, and Jidda, the gateway to the Ḥijāz.

The Sources and their Content

Regarding this raid, Abū Shāma (d. 665/1268) has preserved the contemporary accounts of ‘Imād al-Dīn al-Iṣbahānī (d. 597/1201), Saladin’s well-known secretary and confidant, and al-Qāḍī al-Fāḍil (d. 596/1200), the sultan’s famous counselor and administrator of Egypt. It is Abū Shāma’s rendition of their material which has been especially used by modern historians. However, ‘Imād al-Dīn’s version of this raid and the two major reports on it by al-Fāḍil exist in the original. They are to be found in one of two surviving fragments of ‘Imād al-Dīn’s history, *al-Barq al-shāmī*. Abū Shāma did not copy *al-Barq al-shāmī* here in full. Instead, he cut ‘Imād al-Dīn’s description of the raid in half and to a lesser extent shortened al-Fāḍil’s reports. Nevertheless, he does preserve for the most part the essentials of both. ‘Imād al-Dīn and al-Fāḍil wrote in rhymed prose which

resulted in excess verbiage containing insignificant or repetitive information. To some degree, this perhaps accounts for Abū Shāma's abridgments.

At any rate, the accounts of both 'Imād al-Dīn and al-Fāḍil, who unquestionably knew the Muslim admiral who directed the counterattack, are worth translating—albeit judiciously, for rhymed prose makes the task both difficult and awkward. According to 'Imād al-Dīn:

In Shawwāl, 578 (28 January–25 February, 1183) there occurred the victory of the fleet that entered the Red Sea under the command of al-Ḥāḥib (the chamberlain) Ḥusām al-Dīn Lu'lu' in order to seek out the Franks who had sailed into that sea. When the prince, the ruler of Karak, became hard pressed as a result of the injury inflicted upon him by our troops stationed at the fortress of Ayla,⁸ which is in the midst of the sea and inaccessible to the unbelievers, he gave some thought to a stratagem by which he could capture it and be free to set out on a road of calamities for the Muslims. So he built ships and transported the lumber for them on camels to the coast. Then he put the ships together there hoping to reach the open sea. He loaded them with men and materiel and left two ships at the island of the fortress. The two ships were very powerful and prevented the defenders from obtaining water. The defenders were hurt by the loss of water and supplies. The rest of the ships departed towards 'Aydhāb. They cut the pilgrimage route and began to kill, plunder, and take prisoners. Then they headed for the Ḥijāz. It was impossible for the people there to be warned of this. The presence of the Franks in that sea had never been known and such extreme wickedness had never confronted a pilgrim. Great was the misfortune, and it defied a cure. The evil became worse and was unexpected. The damage spread and became a frightening sign. The weak became worried and the worried became weak. The meek were powerless and the challenge was strong. The flock was put to the test by the worst anguish and the most surprising alarm. The people of Medina were on the brink of danger and of having their two precious places, namely their own city and Mecca, attacked. Fear equally gripped the coasts and misfortune descended like a scourge. News of this reached Egypt where al-Malik al-'Ādil, the brother of the sultan, was in charge. He summoned the important Muslim officials and the leading men of the country. Then he considered who would be best able to go after the unbelievers at sea and destroy them. His choice fell upon the gallant favorite, the bold lion, the unyielding charger, the man of unbounded generosity and unlimited hospitality, al-Ḥāḥib Ḥusām al-Dīn Lu'lu'. He brought to life the old tradition (*sunna*) and noble victory, as previously stated, with faithful action.

Whatever You May Have Thought, The Victory Was Lu'lu's

He provided the ships in the Red Sea with experienced sailors who showed pride and zeal for the faith. They sailed to Ayla and overpowered the Frankish ship there and damaged the (other?) ship and seized its troops. They then crossed the sea to 'Aydhāb and witnessed what the people had suffered. The direction of the ships of the enemy was pointed out and they followed them. They pursued the enemy with speed and knew they were moving slowly. After several days, Lu'lu' came upon them and attacked them and ended their marauding. He scattered their fleet with the help of the wind. Because they were thus weakened, he overwhelmed them. Some of the Franks fled on shore seeking the protection of ravines and climbing hills. At first they fought and avoided capture. Lu'lu' continued to inflict damage on their ships and attack their flanks until they were overcome. He broke the vanquished Franks and neutralized them. He attacked most of

the ships and boarded them and they were his [this sentence is on the margin]. When he called upon the Franks to fight, they fled in all directions finding no escape in the ships. Lu'lu' freed the merchants who had been taken captive and returned to them what had been taken from them, every piece of merchandise, *dirham*, and *dīnār*. He made good every claim they had against the Franks. Then Lu'lu' went ashore and found some Bedouin camped in ravines. His men rode their horses in pursuit of those who had fled. The enemy was travelling along those roads. Lu'lu' besieged them in a ravine in which there was no water. He encircled them with people who were seen and unseen. He prevented them from reaching water and assailed them with thirst... He asked them to surrender. If they would have become Muslims, they would have been protected from harm. But Lu'lu' took all of them prisoner... This was during the pilgrimage months [i.e., Shawwāl-Dhū 'l-Ḥijja, 578/28 January–25 April, 1183]. Two of the prisoners were sent to Minā⁹, as were the animals for sacrifice, and Lu'lu' returned to Cairo with the other prisoners... The sultan wrote to him to cut off their heads and suppress all traces of what they had done so that not one of their eyes would remain to blink and no one would tell of the way of that sea or know of it.¹⁰

At the successful conclusion of the counterattack, al-Qāḍī al-Fāḍil sent a letter recounting it to the caliph in Baghdad. It included the following:

The prince, may God forsake him, had built ships in great number and with much equipment... He had time to devote his energy to this and to do what he wished regarding the fortress of Ayla. When all was ready for what he planned... he set sail in the Gulf of 'Aqaba. He wanted to take the fortress and he spent the night beside it, but he was not able to achieve his wish. So he embarked with his ships into the Red Sea leaving two ships below the fortress to prevent it from obtaining water... Al-Malik al-'Ādil, who was in Egypt, provided ships and prepared them to meet the enemy. From the moment he heard the news, he knew what would be required to get results. He knew that ships of the enemy were blocking the water from the fortress of Ayla and that others had set out to cut the pilgrimage route. So he equipped to go to the fortress someone who would triumph over the two ships... The Islamic ships set out valorously in pursuit of the warships blocking the ships of the Ḥijāz and the Yemen. The ships of the enemy had deeply penetrated the Red Sea. "Arabs" who resembled the men of these ships in their unbelief guided them to openings along the shores. They reached 'Aydhāb but did not achieve their desire except for what they found on the way and in the harbor of 'Aydhāb. They wreaked havoc, destruction, and injury. Then they continued to the Ḥijāzī coast as far as Rābiḡ¹¹ and to the shores of al-Ḥawrā'.¹² There our troops came upon them and viciously attacked them. They quickly seized the Frankish ships. The Franks fled to the shore. Then our troops rode after them on the horses of the Bedouin that they found. They overtook the unbelievers in ravines and mountains where they sought refuge and ran. Thus, the Muslims were saved from the worst iniquity to befall their land and the most unmistakable threat to their ports. Their hopes for capturing the enemy increased. The road became obscure for the unbelievers. If it had been clearly revealed to them and if they had been informed of it, their destruction would have been excessive and their crime enormous. It would have been difficult even for the ancient kings of Egypt to overcome these adversaries, to extinguish these fires, to ride the crests of the chasms, to cheapen precious blood, to hunt this bird at inaccessible heights, to reach this enemy whom only angels of God and Gabriel could catch...¹³

‘Imād al-Dīn records a second letter sent by al-Fāḍil to Baghdad describing this raid. Besides Abū Shāma, Sibṭ b. al-Jawzī (d. 654/1256) and Ibn Wāṣil (d. 697/1298) both copied part of the same letter.¹⁴ It reads:

The Franks set sail on a cunning adventure. They violated the Red Sea as if it were a virgin... They constructed warships and loaded them with fighters, weapons, and supplies. They travelled in them to the shores of the Yemen and the Ḥijāz. They attacked and deeply penetrated the surrounding countries. Intense was the fear of the people of those regions, especially the people of the Qibla (Mecca), when there flashed before them the possible consequences of this. The Muslims thought that it was the Hour of the Day of Judgment and that portents of that day were manifest and the world would be rent asunder once and for all. They anticipated the anger of God to annihilate the danger to His sacred house (the Ka‘ba), the station of Abraham,¹⁵ the legacy of the ancient prophets, and the tomb of His greatest Prophet—may the blessing and salvation of God be upon him. They hoped that a miracle would strike their eyes like the miracle of this house (the Ka‘ba) when the companions of the elephant threatened it.¹⁶ They entrusted themselves entirely to God for He was “sufficient for them and an excellent Guardian” [Koran, 3:173]. The Franks had two objectives. One was the fortress of Ayla which was at the mouth of the Red Sea and controlled its entrances. The other was to penetrate this sea, the shores of which neighbored their country. Thus, they divided their fleet into two units following two routes. As for the unit that went to the fortress of Ayla, it planned to prevent its defenders from obtaining the water necessary to sustain themselves and fight them with the burning, stinging fire of thirst. As for the unit headed for the shores of the Ḥijāz and the Yemen, it planned to deny the pilgrimage route to pilgrims and prevent them from entering the valley of Mecca. The Franks planned to capture the merchants of the Yemen and the Kārimīs¹⁷ of Aden and go ashore in order to seize, God forbid, the Holy Places. They wished to inflict upon the Arabian peninsula the worst possible enormity... The brother of Saladin, Sayf al-Dīn, was in Egypt. He ordered the preparation (*inshā*) of warships when he heard the news about the ships of the unbelievers. He chose them carefully and fully mobilized them. He divided his ships into two units and ordered them to hurry after the enemy in two groups. As for those sailing to the fortress of Ayla, they swooped upon the unit blocking the water like birds of prey and cast them away with the speed of a meteor that lights the still night with its magic glow. All of the ships of the enemy were taken and most of the fighters were killed. Some barely escaped by reaching land and hiding in the ravines, never to return. The Bedouin followed their tracks and were made to catch them. The only ones to escape were those who lost all hope of return and knew that only the Last Judgment remained [this and the previous two sentences are only in Abū Shāma]. As for the Frankish unit sailing to the Red Sea, ...it continued along the Ḥijāzī coast and to Rābigh on the shores of al-Ḥawrā’ [last phrase from Abū Shāma]. They captured merchants and terrified people. They were led to the heights of the country by “Arabs” who were the worst of unbelievers and hypocrites. Our troops came upon them and captured their ships. The Franks fled after the loss of the ships and entered the mountains finding dangerous chasms and perilous encampments. Our troops pursued them on horses of the Bedouin. They completely overpowered them and hunted them down, taking them prisoner and killing them. They followed them for five days, on horse and on foot, day and night, until there was no trace of what they had done and no sign of them remained. “Those who have disbelieved will be driven to hell in groups” [Koran, 39:73]. They bound 170 of them as prisoners.¹⁸

Certainly one of the most interesting of all sources, and in several respects the most valuable, is the great traveller Ibn Jubayr (d. 614/1217). When he arrived in Alexandria on his way from Spain in Dhū 'l-Qa'da, 578/26 February–28 March, 1183, the first thing that he saw was a large crowd of people going to watch a group of Frankish prisoners being brought into town to the sound of drums and horns while sitting backwards on camels. He asked what was happening and was told of the raid. Thus, he states that some "Christians of Syria" near the Gulf of 'Aqaba built sections of ships and carried them to the gulf on camels. The camels belonged to the neighboring Bedouin who were paid an agreed price. Once on the coast, the ships were assembled and launched. Upon reaching the sea of al-Na'am (?), they burned some sixteen ships and then went to 'Aydhāb where they captured a ship of pilgrims coming from Jidda. They also went ashore at 'Aydhāb and captured a large caravan on the way to that port from Qūṣ. They killed everyone accompanying it. They furthermore seized two ships bringing goods from the Yemen and destroyed a large amount of food on the shore which was intended for Medina and Mecca. Worst of all, the Franks planned to march to Medina and remove the Prophet's body from its tomb. They made no secret of this and spread word of it. They were but a day's journey from Medina when Lu'lu' caught up with them. He had prepared ships in Alexandria and Fuṣṭāṭ (Miṣr) and manned them with North African sailors. It took some time for him to overtake the Crusaders, for they had a head start of almost a month and a half. But at last, they were all killed or taken prisoner; the latter being sent to various cities, including Mecca, where they were executed.¹⁹

The contemporary account provided by Ibn al-Athīr (d. 630/1233) confirms much of the above. He only differs somewhat in saying that Reginald had all the sections of his ships built at Karak and then transported to Ayla where they were quickly put together; that the Muslims along the Red Sea were completely surprised for they had never seen a Frank in that sea before, neither a merchant nor a soldier; that the Franks had plundered other ports after taking 'Aydhāb and planned to capture Medina and Mecca, block the pilgrimage routes, and then head for the Yemen; and that some of the Frankish captives were sent to Minā to be slaughtered like animals and the rest were brought to Egypt where they were killed.²⁰

Sibt b. al-Jawzī, who was born shortly before this raid took place, tells much the same story. He adds, however, that the Crusaders wanted to go to Jidda after capturing 'Aydhāb, and it was then that news of this raid reached al-'Ādil in Egypt. He states, moreover, that the wind was in Lu'lu's favor which allowed him to catch up with them when they were very close to Medina. In Sibt's summarized version of al-Qāḍī al-Fāḍil's second letter above, he uses virtually the identical language. In one sentence, though, he reports that the Franks sailed along the Tihāma, the narrow strip of lowlands running the length of the eastern shore of the Red Sea.²¹

Additional details of this raid are to be found in the biographies of Lu'lu'. His obituary notices exist in what we might call a short and long version. Al-Dhahabī (d. 748/1348) records them both. The first does little to supplement what we have learned so far and is derived from al-Mundhirī (d. 656/1258), although al-Dhahabī does not quite follow him word for word.²² The small discrepancies could be explained as copyists' errors. Al-Mundhirī spent most of his life in Egypt. He was a teacher in the Dār al-Ḥadīth al-Kāmiliyya in Cairo and knew hundreds of people there as his biographical dictionary testifies. From him we are told that the chamberlain, Ḥusām al-Dīn Lu'lu' b. 'Abd Allāh al-'Ādilī, died on 13 Ṣafar, 598/13 November, 1201 and was buried near a water basin and well that he built next to the tomb of one Rūzbihān, a Ṣūfī, in Cairo on the Muqaṭṭam Hills. He was a great man of the state and famous for his coastal action against the Franks. There is a bit more information, but of no interest to us.

As for the second and much longer version, al-Dhahabī takes his material from 'Abd al-Laṭīf al-Baghdādī (d. 629/1231–32). 'Abd al-Laṭīf was born in Baghdad and went to Egypt shortly

after 587/1188 aged around thirty. He knew Saladin, 'Imād al-Dīn al-Iṣbahānī, al-Qāḍī al-Fāḍil, and Bahā' al-Dīn b. Shaddād, the biographer of Saladin. Moreover, in Cairo he resided and taught in a mosque (*masjid*) built by al-Ḥāḥib Lu'lu'. He therefore undoubtedly knew Lu'lu' personally. 'Abd al-Laṭīf wrote dozens of works on a wide variety of subjects. Al-Dhahabī does not name which of 'Abd al-Laṭīf's books that he used, but it was probably the former's great history of Egypt, *Kitāb akhbār Miṣr al-kabīr*. Unfortunately, it, like most of his other works, is lost.²³

Citing 'Abd al-Laṭīf, al-Dhahabi begins with a number of details about Lu'lu's background and character. We learn, among other things, that he had served under Saladin as the commander of the fleet, but then gave up that position to devote himself to pious works such as outfitting ships for the pilgrimage. He also seems to have acquired considerable wealth which he gave to the poor.²⁴ Upon the conclusion of this description of Lu'lu's personality, we come to his most famous exploit. We are told that, when Saladin was in Ḥarrān (in northern Mesopotamia, now in Turkey), the Franks of Karak and Shawbak set out to dig up the grave (*huḡra*) of the Prophet and take his remains with them. They planned to charge the Muslims money in order to visit his body. Saladin "stood up to this and sat down," for it was impossible for him to leave from where he was. So he sent a message to Sayf al-Dawla b. Munqidh,²⁵ his deputy (*nā'ib*) in Egypt, instructing him to equip Lu'lu' to pursue the Franks. Sayf al-Dawla asked Lu'lu', "In your estimation, how many of them are there?" and he replied, "Around 300 and all are brave men." So he took shackles for that number. The Franks had with them a party of Bedouin who had apostasized. There remained between the Crusaders and Medina but one day's journey when Lu'lu' caught up with them. He distributed money and the Bedouin went over to him for the gold. The Franks sought refuge on a high mountain. Lu'lu' himself went after them on foot with nine men. The strength of the accursed ones was bewildered by God and that of Lu'lu' made firmer. Then the Franks surrendered. He bound them and brought them to Cairo where the jurists (*fuqahā'*), the devout, and the Ṣūfīs killed them.²⁶

In the course of giving a rundown of the baths of Cairo, one of which was built by Lu'lu', al-Maqrizī (d. 845/1442) records a fairly long biography of our chamberlain. This was the most detailed account of him to be composed after the death of al-Dhahabī. Al-Maqrizī does not name his source or sources. However, a number of his sentences are identical to, or very closely parallel, those in 'Abd al-Laṭīf's version. But there is more material here than that quoted by al-Dhahabī. Thus, al-Dhahabī may have only summarized 'Abd al-Laṭīf. This possibility is supported by the fact that the structure of al-Maqrizī's version, as we shall see, is almost that of 'Abd al-Laṭīf's and seems to come from a single source. The alternative, of course, would be that al-Maqrizī copied someone very familiar with 'Abd al-Laṭīf's work who supplemented it, or, he added material to 'Abd al-Laṭīf from elsewhere.

Al-Maqrizī starts by outlining Lu'lu's career, piety, and generosity. Coming to the raid, he states that the Franks of Karak and Shawbak set out for Medina to dig up the Prophet's tomb (*qabr*) and take his body to their country for reburial. Then they would not allow the Muslims to visit it unless they paid a fee. Reginald, the ruler of Karak, constructed ships and transported them overland to the Red Sea. He loaded them with men and stationed two ships at the "island of the fortress of al-Qulzum" to prevent its defenders from obtaining water. The Franks then sailed for 'Aydhāb killing and taking prisoners. They went on, intending to capture Medina and Muḥammad's remains. This was in the year 578. Saladin was in Ḥarrān. When he learned of this, he sent Sayf al-Dawla b. Munqidh, his *nā'ib* in Egypt, an order to equip Lu'lu' to pursue the enemy. So he made preparations and took shackles with him and went to Suez (al-Qulzum) where ships were provided. He sailed to Ayla and burned the Frankish ships he found there while taking all the Franks prisoner. Continuing to 'Aydhāb, he followed the Franks until he caught up with them

when only a day's march from Medina. There were around 300 of them. They were joined by Bedouin who apostasized. When Lu'lu' came upon them, the Bedouin fled in bands from his power and out of desire for his gifts. He distributed money, even hanging sacks of silver from the tips of his lances. When the Bedouin fled, the Franks sought refuge at the top of a mountain which was difficult to climb. But ten Muslims went up after them and cut them off. Their strength began to wane after they had shown much courage and they surrendered. The Crusaders were shackled and carried to Cairo. Their entry into Cairo was a great event. The Ṣūfis, jurists, and chief religious officials killed them. Two of the leaders of the Franks were sent to Minā and slaughtered like the beasts that are brought as offerings to the Ka'ba.²⁷

In his voluminous history of the Ayyūbids and Mamlūks, al-Maqrīzī speaks again of Reginald's raid. Just as before, he cites no sources, but partly follows what he says in Lu'lu's biography. He also apparently used 'Imād al-Dīn and Ibn Jubayr. Altogether, there is no new material to be found here.²⁸

Notes on the Raid

The above sources contain the most important material on the raid in 578/1182-83 to have so far come down to us.²⁹ We are rather fortunate to have so many contemporary accounts of it, above all from 'Imād al-Dīn, al-Qāḍī al-Fāḍil, Ibn al-Athīr, Ibn Jubayr, and 'Abd al-Laṭīf. Although they differ in a number of details, the outline of the raid is clear. As we have seen, Ibn Jubayr witnessed the arrival of the captives in Alexandria in Dhū 'l-Qa'da, 578/26 February-28 March, 1183. If his claim that the Franks had a head start of a month and a half is correct, and we take into consideration the time it took to bring the prisoners to Alexandria, Reginald must have actually launched his raid no later than December, 1182 or early January, 1183. This is confirmed by 'Imād al-Dīn who states that the victory of Lu'lu' occurred in Shawwāl, 578/28 January-25 February, 1183. Reginald's preparations for this operation and the transportation of the sections of the ships to the sea, therefore, took place a few months earlier.

The process of constructing and then carrying the disassembled ships overland would have been difficult to keep secret, and secrecy was essential for surprise. Saladin surely had spies about. Moreover, the Bedouin whom Reginald hired to transport the ships would have obviously seen what he was doing. Still, at that point he may not have made his exact intentions known. This might explain Ernoul's misrepresentation of this affair.³⁰

If Reginald needed the Bedouin to help him move his ships, he was completely dependent upon Muslims once he was at sea, for this was an unknown world to the Franks. Here his guides and pilots ("Arabs") could not have been strictly Bedouin, but presumably were pirates familiar with the difficulties of Red Sea navigation. This sea was well known for its treacherous reefs and shoals.³¹ And it goes without saying that one would have been entirely at the mercy of its winds. Whereas in the summer the prevailing winds are from the north, in the winter—when our raid took place—the winds are just as strong from the south as a result of the northeastern monsoon in the Arabian Sea. This can make the actual wind direction on a given winter day highly unpredictable, and sailing across the Red Sea often more difficult than sailing along its length.³² In Shawwāl, 575/March, 1180, al-Qāḍī al-Fāḍil returned from the pilgrimage by sailing from Jidda to 'Aydhāb. The crossing was so harrowing that he almost lost his life.³³ Ibn Jubayr even had much the same experience in Rabī' I, 579/July, 1183.³⁴ It is, consequently, significant that Lu'lu' had the wind in his favor when he went after the Crusaders. Otherwise, the latter would have certainly reached Medina and perhaps Mecca before his arrival.

We cannot be sure how many ships Reginald was able to launch. Ernoul says he had five galleys.³⁵ Except for Ibn al-Dawādārī (d. after 736/1335), the Arabic sources do not give the number of

vessels nor distinguish different types. They are all called simply *markab* or *safīna*, that is, "ship." Ibn al-Dawādārī describes Reginald's craft as ships and galleys (*shawānī*).³⁶ It is likely that the Franks had between five and ten vessels under sail. It is difficult to guess the number of men who made up the crew and the troops, but Lu'lu's estimate of the total at 300 was probably fairly accurate.

The two ships that were left to blockade the Muslim fortress at Ayla, known as Ile de Graye, were doubtless supposed to prevent the defenders from sending word of Reginald's activities to Cairo or to Saladin in Syria. Forcing them to surrender by cutting their water supply was possibly their second objective. Word, however, did reach Cairo; if not from a spy or someone on the Gulf of 'Aqaba, then surely from the people of 'Aydhāb after they were attacked. The news would have travelled rather rapidly down the Nile. It is difficult to believe that Cairo first learned of the raid from Saladin. By the time Lu'lu' set out in pursuit, he obviously knew the situation at Ayla as well as at 'Aydhāb, if al-Qāḍī al-Fāḍil is right in saying that he divided his fleet accordingly.

It is unclear what Ibn Jubayr means when he states that Lu'lu' prepared ships in Alexandria and Fustāṭ. Does this mean that Lu'lu' brought at least some ships in sections overland to the Gulf of Suez? This plainly would have cost him time. Perhaps Ibn Jubayr is only referring to provisions, but this too would have caused a delay. Otherwise, the Red Sea fleet seems to have been at anchor in the Gulf of Suez where it could be quickly readied for service.³⁷ Lu'lu' was, of course, well acquainted with the Red Sea as an admiral and undoubtedly as a pilgrim. Such knowledge would, naturally, have added to his speed.

For most of the forty-five days or so that the Crusaders held free rein in the Red Sea, they occupied themselves with plunder. Although their itinerary ultimately depended on the wind, they knew that riches awaited them at 'Aydhāb. Like all ships in those days, they followed the coastline as much as possible. This gave them a good chance to intercept merchantmen in route, which they did. Everywhere the Muslims, and surely the Jewish and any other native traders, were taken completely by surprise and could offer no resistance. 'Aydhāb and the caravan from Qūṣ were easily taken. Afterwards, the Franks were heavily laden with booty. This plus the merchants and pilgrims they had captured, certainly to be held for ransom, slowed them down. They may have even taken in tow some of the merchant ships that they had seized. Clearly, this would also have helped Lu'lu' to catch up with them.

Although Sibṭ b. al-Jawzī says the Franks next intended to go to Jidda, they never got there. Their furthest southern penetration was probably Rābigh where Lu'lu' came upon them. They may well have been blown off course, for it would have been faster to reach Medina, their objective, via Yanbu' which was closer to 'Aydhāb than Rābigh. Once they reached the Ḥijāz, the sequence of events becomes a bit confused. It seems that a contingent of Franks headed for Medina guided by local Bedouin whom they had bribed. There is little question that their primary purpose was to exhume Muḥammad's body and bring it back. Some of the Crusaders remained with their ships and booty. They were the ones whom Lu'lu' immediately scattered on shore. It took him some five days to track down the rest who were dangerously close to Medina. After the Franks had been overwhelmed, there was no doubt about what should be done with the survivors. None of them could live to tell of the vulnerability of the Muslims in the Red Sea. This raid was also a blow to Saladin's prestige so there is more than a trace of vindictiveness and outrage in his decision concerning the fate of the Frankish prisoners.

Reginald was to remain a thorn in Saladin's side. It appears that he did not personally participate in the raid, but stayed at Karak. He perhaps never fully learned what his men had done. Ernoul remarks that once they set sail, they were never heard from again.³⁸ The lack of survivors would easily explain the absence of any record of this raid in Western sources. Things, of course, fared

much better for Lu'lu'. In a letter dated 5 Dhū 'l-Qa'da, 578/1 March, 1183 and written by al-Qāḍī al-Fāḍil on behalf of Saladin to al-'Ādil in Egypt, the chamberlain is given high praise. The same letter points out the danger in Frankish access to the Red Sea, the Ḥijāz, and in their knowledge of the conditions there. Al-'Ādil is instructed to expunge all trace of what happened.³⁹ Saladin was to send two more letters to make sure that the prisoners were put to death.⁴⁰ He would take no chances. It is not possible to determine if Lu'lu' had left Saladin's service before our raid, was recalled to combat it, and then remained in charge of the navy; or if he retired sometime later. We know that he was in command of the fleet in 585/1189.⁴¹ That he has been able to spend so much money on the poor and undertake various public works may suggest he received a generous reward for his service, above all for his victory over the raiders.

The Significance of the Raid

In a very real sense, Reginald's attack on the Red Sea and the Ḥijāz was obviously a failure. But at the same time, we should not overlook his accomplishments. His daring stunned the Muslim world and damaged the reputation of Saladin who had been caught completely off balance. Most important, there was no guarantee that Reginald would not try again with even larger forces. Certainly no one could then predict when reinforcements or a new Crusade might come from Europe and, although Reginald may not have fully realized it, he had discovered an area where they could have a devastating effect. Surprisingly enough, Saladin did not immediately besiege Reginald, but devoted himself to overcoming his Muslim rivals in Syria. Apart from annihilating the Frankish prisoners, however, he does seem to have sent his Mediterranean fleet to attack Acre and other Crusader ports in retaliation for Reginald's raid. The last letter recorded by Abū Shāma and written by al-Qāḍī al-Fāḍil in the series concerning our raid says that the Muslims attacked Frankish ships carrying planed (*manjūra*) lumber to Acre. The enemy ships also had aboard many carpenters who were going to use the lumber to build galleys.⁴² Was Reginald already planning another raid?

We mentioned at the beginning of this paper that the Red Sea raid was almost a stroke of genius. Had it succeeded or been followed up, the Crusades would have taken a much different course, most likely to the benefit of the Franks. A Frankish foothold on, or partial domination of, the Red Sea would have had at least the following consequences:

1) The Yemen would have been cut off from the rest of the Ayyūbid dominions. In fact in 578/1182 not long before the raid, Saladin had sent his brother, Sayf al-Islām Tuḡtukīn, to the Yemen to crush a revolt and take charge of the country.⁴³ He was still there when the Franks set sail. Hence, he and his troops were isolated from Egypt. Cutting them off would have had little impact on the Crusades, but it was certainly of concern to Saladin.

2) The principal Muslim pilgrimage routes from the West would have been blocked. Reginald even then impeded this traffic going overland from Egypt, an approach which would not be secure until the time of Baybars (d. 676/1277).⁴⁴ For the Muslims of Spain, North Africa (including Egypt), and the Sudan (in its widest sense) the only alternative—other than somehow trying to reach Damascus—was to go up or down the Nile and then over to the Red Sea ports, mainly 'Aydhāb. Once the sea lanes were cut, the Western pilgrims were essentially stopped. This would surely have led to a decline in Muslim morale and have further undermined Saladin's leadership. Above all, it would have resulted in economic loss to Egypt, the sultan's richest province and major source of power. Catering to the needs of pilgrims was a business in Egypt, whether providing food or transportation, not to mention the spin-off for the usual merchant trade. Although Saladin had abolished the customs duties imposed on pilgrims in Egypt and the Ḥijāz, his orders were not always strictly enforced; and this did not, for example, reduce the avarice of the Red Sea boat-

men.⁴⁵ All had much to lose. Needless to say, the economic cost to the Ḥijāz would have been even greater.

3) The Franks would have been able to prey upon the India trade just as they began to do. This trade was one of Egypt's major sources of revenue. The potential losses at the hands of Frankish raiders could have been enormous. Saladin's war effort would have been seriously hampered while the Crusaders' wealth and power would have correspondingly risen. In another letter to the caliph after the raid, Saladin again mentions the dangers of permitting the Franks to enter the Red Sea with regard to shipping.⁴⁶ He clearly wanted to reiterate what should have been plain to see in his other letters. The commerce with India was of the utmost importance. After this raid, the sultan may even have gone so far as to restrict the Coptic Christians and Jews of Egypt from directly engaging in the Red Sea trade.⁴⁷

4) The Franks would have been able to interfere in Upper Egypt. This incident revealed how easily the Bedouin could be induced to serve the Franks against the interests of Saladin and the Muslims in general. Their reputation for having a rather carefree attitude towards Islam was well deserved. Those tribes on or near the Red Sea presented opportunities for exploitation by the Franks. Already in 566/1170-71, Saladin had had to send another of his brothers, Shams al-Dawla Tūrānshāh, to Upper Egypt to chastise the Bedouin who had been pillaging the countryside.⁴⁸ The Bedouin were not the only source of trouble in Upper Egypt. In 568/1172, Shams al-Dawla was forced to return to defeat the invading Nubians.⁴⁹ In 570/1174, a revolt broke out in Aswan. The rebels were composed of Sudanese and Bedouin who wanted to re-establish the Fāṭimid dynasty, and they began to march towards Cairo. This time Saladin sent al-ʿĀdil who crushed them near Qūṣ.⁵⁰ The Franks, therefore, could potentially stir up not only the Bedouin and other dissidents in Upper Egypt, but could also encourage whatever pro-Fāṭimid sentiment existed there. This could be dangerous for the sultan. After all, in 569/1174 the Crusaders had been involved in the attempted Fāṭimid coup against him in Cairo. When the Fāṭimid caliphate was overthrown, many of its supporters fled to Upper Egypt. We have word of Shiʿis in this region as late as the 8th/14th century.⁵¹ Saladin had to keep a wary eye on Upper Egypt and could never be sure that the Fāṭimid opposition was completely eliminated. A small pro-Fāṭimid demonstration in Cairo in 584/1188 proved that they were still around.⁵²

5) The Franks would have directly threatened the Holy Cities of Medina and Mecca. This has been clear to all modern writers who have taken account of this raid; but they have generally overlooked the fact that on this occasion Reginald actually hoped to dig up the Prophet's remains and place them in Crusader hands. Had he been successful, the consequences can hardly be imagined. It is just as hazardous to guess what Reginald thought this would accomplish. Given the declining position of the Latin states, did he believe that this would somehow sound the death knell of Islam and result in a lasting triumph for the Crusaders? Probably not. The claim that he planned to rebury the body (where?) and charge Muslims to visit it, as if it were a kind of tourist concession, should also be dismissed. Instead, Reginald certainly intended to use the body for bargaining purposes, just as the Muslims had used the "true cross." This would have given the Franks immense leverage in dealing with their Muslim enemies. Of course, there was also the possibility of a Muslim backlash. Such a loss might have galvanized them into forceful action far faster than any single leader was able to do and, thus, have led to an abrupt end of the Crusaders. Although we are speculating here, Saladin was doing the same. He could not predict all the consequences of a successful Crusader attack on Medina and Mecca, but certainly knew it was of critical importance to prevent such a possibility.

All five of the above considerations must have gone through the sultan's mind when he learned of Reginald's raid. He could not help but have been shaken. Reginald's blow would reverberate

for some time. Saladin would get no peace from this devil of a knight until he finally captured him at the battle of Ḥiṭṭīn in 583/1187. It was with some relief that the sultan personally executed him.

The University of Utah

* This is an expanded version of a paper delivered at the 186th meeting of the American Oriental Society in Philadelphia, 1976.

¹ *The Geography of Strabo*, Eng. trans. Horace Leonard Jones (Cambridge, Mass., 1930), VII, 353–63.

² See R. B. Sergeant, *The Portuguese off the South Arabian Coast* (Oxford, 1963), p. 16.

³ See, e.g., Joseph F. Michaud, *Histoire des croisades*, 6th ed. (Paris, 1841), II, 255; Reinhold Röhricht, *Geschichte des Königreichs Jerusalem 1100–1291* (Innsbruck, 1898), p. 401; Gustave Schlumberger, *Renaud de Châtillon* (Paris, 1923), a rather romanticized description, pp. 199–221; René Grousset, *Histoire des croisades et du royaume franc de Jérusalem* (Paris, 1934–36), II, 701, 732–36; Jean Richard, *La Royaume latin de Jérusalem* (Paris, 1953), p. 59; Steven Runciman, *A History of the Crusades* (Cambridge, 1951–54), perhaps the most straightforward version, II, 436–37; most recently in Andrew S. Ehrenkreutz, *Saladin* (Albany, N.Y., 1972), pp. 179–80 and Robert Laurence Nicholson, *Joscelyn III and the Fall of the Crusader States 1134–99* (Leiden, 1973), p. 112.

Douglas Newbold's "The Crusaders in the Red Sea and the Sudan," *Sudan Notes and Records*, 26 (1945), 13–27, was a speech delivered at the Supper Club in Khartoum in 1943. He says it was based on the Muslim writers 'Imād al-Dīn al-Iṣbahānī, al-Qāḍī al-Fāḍil, Ibn al-Athīr, and Ibn Jubayr (see below in the text) but he uses considerable license and makes many mistakes. Gerald de Gaury's description of the Red Sea raid parallels Newbold's and is equally inaccurate, *Rulers of Mecca* (London, 1951), pp. 79–83.

⁴ *Chronique d'Ernouf et de Bernard le trésorier*, ed. L. Mas Latrie (Paris, 1871), II, 69–70 in the series for La Société de l'Histoire de France. On the identity and sources of Ernouf, see Margaret R. Morgan, *The Chronicle of Ernouf and the Continuations of William of Tyre* (Oxford, 1973).

⁵ On the events in the Levant in the ten years prior to the Red Sea raid, see Runciman, *Crusades*, II, 403–35.

⁶ 'Imād al-Dīn in Abū Shāma, *al-Rawḍatain fī akhbār al-dawlatain* (Cairo, 1287–88), II, 23.

⁷ *Al-Kāmil fī 'l-ta'rikh* (Beirut, 1965–67), XI, 470; Ibn Wāṣil, *Muḥarrij al-kurūb* (Cairo, 1953–00), II, 101–02; Ibn Kathīr, *al-Bidāya wa 'l-nihāya* (Cairo, 1351/1932), XIII, 309.

⁸ The present 'Aqaba on the Gulf of 'Aqaba; see H. W. Glidden, "Ayla," *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, 2nd

ed. (hereinafter referred to as *EI*¹ and *EI*² for the 1st and 2nd eds. respectively), I, 783–84.

⁹ A place in the hills east of Mecca. The concluding ceremonies of the pilgrimage are held here including the sacrifice of animals; see F. Buhl, "Minā," *EI*¹, III, 498–99.

¹⁰ *Al-Barq al-shāmī*, Bodleian Library MS. Marsh 425 (microfilm, Medieval Microfilm Project of the Medieval Studies Committee, University of Pennsylvania), fols. 42a–44a. Cf. *al-Rawḍatain*, II, 35–36.

¹¹ A town on the coast north of Jidda. Yāqūt (d. 626/1229) describes the place as a valley (*wādī*) travelled by pilgrims, *Mu'jam al-buldān*, ed. Ferdinand Wüstenfeld (Leipzig, 1866–70), II, 727–28.

¹² Yāqūt calls it a desolate region with an anchorage for Egyptian ships calling on Medina, *Mu'jam al-buldān*, II, 356. Cf. al-Maqdisī (d. ca. 390/1000), *Aḥṣan al-taqāsīm* (Leiden, 1902), p. 12.

¹³ *Al-Barq al-shāmī*, fols. 44a–45a. Cf. *al-Rawḍatain*, II, 37.

¹⁴ *Mir'āt al-zamān* (Hyderabad, Deccan, 1370/1951–52), VIII, pt. 1, 370 and *Muḥarrij al-kurūb*, II, 129–30 respectively. Al-Dhahabī copied this report from Abū Shāma, and Sibṭ and Ibn Wāṣil apparently did too, *Ta'rikh al-islām*, Ahmet III MS. 2917 (Institute of Arabic Manuscripts, Cairo, microfilm 98/2 *ta'rikh*), XV, fols. 202b–203a.

¹⁵ The station or *maqām* of Abraham is a stone near the Ka'ba on which Abraham is said to have stood when he built that sanctuary, A. J. Wensinck – [J. Jomier], "Ka'ba," *EI*², IV, 318.

¹⁶ This refers, of course, to the Abyssinian campaign against Mecca in the year of Muḥammad's birth, around 570. The invading army included war elephants and was destroyed by a miracle, Koran, 105:1–5.

¹⁷ On the Kārimī merchants, see S. D. Goitein, "The Beginning of the Kārim Merchants and the Character of their Organization," in his *Studies in Islamic History and Institutions* (Leiden, 1966), pp. 351–60; see also Subhi Labib "Kārimī," *EI*², IV, 640–43.

¹⁸ *Al-Barq al-shāmī*, fols. 45a–46a. Cf. *al-Rawḍatain*, II, 37.

¹⁹ *Rihla* (Beirut, 1384/1964), pp. 34–35. For a full Eng. trans., see R. J. C. Broadhurst, *The Travels of Ibn Jubayr* (London, 1952), pp. 51–53. A Fr. trans. of this passage was perhaps first made by Gaston Wiet, *L'Égypte arabe*, vol. 4 of *Histoire de la nation égypt-*

tienne, ed. Gabriel Hanotaux (Paris, [1931-40]), pp. 322-24.

²⁰ *Al-Kāmil*, XI, 490-91. Abū 'l-Fidā's account of this raid comes from Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Mukhtaṣar fī akhbār al-bashar* ([Bagdad, 1968?]), III, 65. Al-Nuwayrī also uses the same source, *Nihāyat al-arab*, Dār al-Kutub MS. 549 *ma'ārif 'amma*, XXVI, 121; as does al-'Aynī, *'Iqd al-jumān*, Ahmet III MS. 2911 (Institute of Arabic Manuscripts, Cairo, microfilm 334 *ta'rīkh*), XII, fol. 225b, although he refers to it as *ta'rīkh al-mu'ayyad*.

²¹ *Mir'āt al-zamān*, VIII, pt. 1, 369-70. Sibṭ's version is also found in Ibn al-Khazrajī, *Ta'rīkh dawlat al-akrād wa 'l-atrāk*, Hekimoğlu Ali Paşa MS. 695, fols. 6b-7a; and minus the reference to al-Qāḍī al-Fāḍil's letter in al-'Aynī, *'Iqd*, XII, fol. 225a.

²² See al-Mundhirī's *al-Takmila li-Wafayāt al-naqala*, ed. 1st 4 vols. Bashshār 'Awwād Ma'rūf, (Baghdad, 1388-91/1968-71), II, 332-33. Cf. al-Ṣafadī, *al-Wāfi bi-'l-wafayāt*, Ahmet III MS. 2920 (Institute of Arabic Manuscripts, Cairo, microfilm 565 *ta'rīkh*), XXIV, fol. 190b; and Ibn al-Furāt, *Ta'rīkh al-duwal wa 'l-mulūk* (Baṣra, 1969), IV, pt. 2, 245.

²³ Ibn Abī Uṣaybi'a, *'Uyūn al-anbā' fī ṭabaqāt al-aṭibbā'* ed. August Müller (Königsberg i. Pr., 1884), II, 201-13; Carl Brockelmann, *Geschichte der arabischen Literature* (Leiden, 1943-49), *Supplement* (Leiden, 1937-42), I, 632-33, *Supp.* I, 880-81; S. M. Stern, "Abd al-Laṭīf al-Baghdādī," *EI*², I, 74.

²⁴ *Ta'rīkh al-islām*, XIV, fols. 248a and b.

²⁵ Sayf al-Dawla was one of Saladin's *amīrs*. There is no record of his serving as the sultan's deputy in Egypt; Ibn Khallikān, *Wafayāt al-a'yān*, ed. Iḥsān 'Abbās (Beirut, 1968-72), IV, 144-46; Abū Shāma, *al-Rawḍatain*, II, 25. Al-Mundhirī says he was in charge of at least some branches of the administration in Egypt for a time, *al-Takmila*, I, 350-51.

²⁶ *Ta'rīkh al-islām*, XIV, fol. 248b. Cf. al-Yāfi'i, *Mir'āt al-janān* (Hyderabad, Deccan, 1337-39), III, 495; and Ibn al-'Imād, *Shadharāt al-dhahab* (Cairo, 1350-51), IV, 336-37.

²⁷ *Al-Mawā'iz wa 'l-i'tibār bi-dhikr al-khiṭaṭ wa 'l-āthār* ([Būlāq, 1853]), II, 85-86. Cf. Mujīr al-Dīn al-'Ulaymī, *al-Uns al-jalīl* (Najaf, 1388/1968), I, 316-17.

²⁸ *Kitāb al-sulūk* (Cairo, 1956), I, pt. 1, 78-79.

²⁹ Ibn al-Dawādārī mentions our raid under the year 577, *Kanz al-durar* (Cairo, 1960-72), VII, 71-72. He differs from the others in saying that Reginald assembled "ships and galleys" (see note 36), that he captured ships of the Kārimīs full of spices and other goods, and that Lu'lu' returned to 'Aydhab after his victory in the Ḥijāz and brought there what the Crusaders had taken. The chamberlain then took his prisoners down the Nile via Qūṣ to Cairo. Ibn Kathīr's description is very brief and adds nothing

new, *al-Bidāya*, XII, 309 and XIII, 23-24; cf. al-'Aynī, *'Iqd*, XII, fol. 225a. Poetry in praise of Lu'lu' by Ibn al-Dharawī is recorded by Abū Shāma, *al-Rawḍatain*, II, 36, 240. Both al-Ṣafadī, *al-Wāfi*, XXIV, fols. 190b-191a and al-'Aynī, *'Iqd*, XII, fol. 225b also cite the same poet. Ibn al-Dharawī is supposed to have died in 577/1181-82, but his verses extol Lu'lu's victory over the Franks as well as his piety and high standing. Ibn al-Dharawī knew the last Fāṭimid caliph, Saladin, and al-Qāḍī al-Fāḍil. For further notes on him, see Imād al-Dīn, *Kharīdat al-qaṣr*, Egyptian section (Cairo, 1370/1951), I, 187-88.

³⁰ For this raid in the context of the search for the source of the Nile, see Enrico Cerulli, *Etiopi in Palestina* (Rome, 1943), I, 22-26.

³¹ E.g., al-Maqdisī, *Aḥsan al-taqāsīm*, p. 12.

³² For an idea of the prevailing winds, see the *Oxford Regional Economic Atlas: The Middle East and North Africa* (Oxford, 1964), p. 33. It was not until the introduction of the steam ship that the winds on the Red Sea could be handled with some confidence, Jacques Jomier, *Le Maḥmal et la caravane égyptienne des pèlerins de la Mecque* (Cairo, 1953), p. 148.

³³ 'Imād al-Dīn in Abū Shāma, *al-Rawḍatain*, II, 14.

³⁴ *Rihla*, pp. 51-52.

³⁵ *Chronique d'Ernoul*, p. 69.

³⁶ *Kanz al-durar*, VII, 71. On *shawānī*, see Aly Mohammad Fahmy, *Muslim Naval Organization from the 7th to the 10th Century A.D.*, 2nd ed. (Cairo, 1966), p. 131-32 and index, for *markab* and *saḥīna*, p. 125.

³⁷ Ehrenkreutz, "The Place of Saladin in the Naval History of the Mediterranean Sea in the Middle Ages," *JAOS*, 75 (1955), 107.

³⁸ *Chronique d'Ernoul*, p. 70.

³⁹ In Abū Shāma, *al-Rawḍatain*, II, 36.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 36-37.

⁴¹ Ehrenkreutz, "The Place of Saladin," p. 113.

⁴² *Al-Rawḍatain*, II, 37.

⁴³ Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, XI, 480-81; Ibn Wāṣil, *Mufarrij*, III, 319.

⁴⁴ Jomier, *Le Maḥmal*, p. 33.

⁴⁵ Ibn Jubayr, *Rihla*, on the customs duties, pp. 30-31, 45, 54-56, 257 and on rapacious boatmen, pp. 47-48.

⁴⁶ Al-Qalqashandī, *Ṣubḥ al-a'shā* (Cairo, 1331-38), XIII, 83-86.

⁴⁷ Following our raid, the Muslim Kārimī merchants began to monopolize the Red Sea trade, see Subhi Labib, *Handelsgeschichte Ägyptens im Spätmittelalter (1171-1517)* (Wiesbaden, 1965), pp. 61-63; also his article "Kārimī," *EI*², IV, 640. We should note that by the beginning of the 13th century, the Geniza documents are little concerned with the Red Sea and India commerce, S. D. Goitein, *A Mediterranean*

Society (Berkeley, 1967), I, 149. Curiously enough, no reference to Reginald's raid has appeared in the Geniza—personal communication from S. D. o Gitein.

⁴⁸ Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, XI, 366. On the unreliability of the Bedouin, see Hamilton A. R. Gibb, "The Armies of Saladin," in his *Studies on the Civilization of Islam* (Boston, 1962), pp. 82–83. Ibn Jubayr comments on the superficiality of Islam among the people of 'Aydhāb, *Rihla*, p. 66.

⁴⁹ 'Imād al-Dīn in Abū Shāma, *al-Rawḍatain*, I,

208–09; Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, XI, 386–87; Ibn Wāṣil, *Muḥarrirj*, I, 228–29.

⁵⁰ Ibn Shaddād, *Sīrat Ṣalāh al-Dīn* ([Cairo], 1964), pp. 47–48; Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, XI, 414; Ibn Wāṣil, *Muḥarrirj*, II, 16–17.

⁵¹ Al-Udfuwī, *al-Ṭāli' al-sa'īd* (Cairo, 1966), pp. 66–67, 169–71, 215, 330–37, 368.

⁵² 'Imād al-Dīn in Abū Shāma, *al-Rawḍatain*, II, 137–38; Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, XII, 24; Ibn Wāṣil, *Muḥarrirj*, II, 276–77.